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Bringing	in	the	experts:	blame	deflection	and	the
COVID-19	crisis
The	current	political	emphasis	on	‘the	experts’	is	partly	a	depoliticisation
and	blame	deflection	strategy	to	render	them,	instead	of	the	politicians,	as	the
public	face	of	the	coronavirus	crisis,	write	Matthew	Flinders	and	Gergana
Dimova.
‘People	in	this	country	have	had	enough	of	experts,’	Michael	Gove	(in)famously
declared	as	part	of	the	assault	on	‘the	establishment’	and	‘elites’	that	formed	such	a	central	element	of	the	Leave
campaign	and	Brexit.	And	yet	now	many	key	members	of	that	campaign	seemed	to	have	adopted	a	very	different
strategic	position.	Instead	of	deriding	and	distancing	the	experts,	the	government	is	now	hugging	them	close.
The	frailties	of	evidence-based	policy,	or	what	is	now	more	often	termed	‘evidence-led’	policy,	have	been	well-
documented	within	the	social	sciences.	The	rational,	technocratic,	data-driven	recommendations	of	the	scientists
will	at	some	point	fall	upon	the	procrustean	realities	of	frequently	irrational	and	commonly	dysfunctional	political	life.
And	yet	one	of	the	defining	performative	elements	of	the	coronavirus	crisis	is	the	daily	reports	of	the	Prime	Minister
or	senior	ministers	at	which	they	are	flanked	both	figuratively	and	literally	by	‘the	experts’.	No	message,	statement
or	utterance	can	be	made	by	a	representative	of	the	government	without	being	foreshadowed	and	subsequently
enmeshed	within	the	golden	phrase	that	is	‘following	the	expert	advice	we	are	receiving’.
In	some	countries	a	new	public	service	bargain	seems	to	have	emerged	whereby	the	politicians	depart	the	stage	to
an	almost	total	extent	and	let	the	experts	become	the	public	face	of	the	crisis.	Anthony	Fauci,	the	director	of	the
National	Institute	of	Allergy	and	Infectious	Diseases	in	the	United	States,	Fernando	Simón,	the	head	of	health
emergency	centre	in	Spain,	Christian	Drosten,	the	head	of	virology	at	Charité	hospital	in	Germany	and	Jérôme
Salomon,	head	of	the	national	health	authority	in	France	have	emerged	as	some	of	the	most	visible	faces	of	the
response	to	the	pandemic.	It’s	‘the	experts’	that	are	now	the	household	names.
So	how	can	we	understand	this	sudden	shift	from	loathing	the	experts	to	loving	them?
Unlike	dealing	with	the	coronavirus	crisis	itself,	the	answer	to	this	question	is	refreshingly	simple.	The	pandemic	is	a
toxic	issue	for	all	politicians:	not	just	in	the	sense	of	the	epidemiology	of	the	crisis	and	its	public	health	implications
but	also	because	the	nature	of	politics	means	that	at	the	end	of	the	day	someone	will	be	scapegoated	and	blamed
for	the	crisis.	Scapegoating,	finger-pointing,	arse-covering	and	the	emergence	of	blame	games	(and	blame
boomerangs)	are	one	of	the	few	predictions	that	anyone	can	make	about	the	current	crisis	with	any	certainty.
From	appearing	as	external	annoyances	offering	unhelpful	facts	as	they	did	to	those	promoting	leaving	the
European	Union,	the	experts	now	offer	political	cover.	That	is,	potentially	the	most	beautiful	blame-shifting	political
bullet-catching	safety	net	ever	built	around	today’s	politicians	but	like	spiders	building	a	web	the	beauty	veils	a
deeper	predatory	aspect.	Bringing	in	the	experts	and	hugging	them	close	is	a	politicized	form	of	self-preservation
strategy	that	might	(and	it	is	a	rather	dubious	‘might’)	afford	politicians	some	distance	from	direct	culpability	when
things	go	wrong.
And	they	will	go	wrong.	Coping	with	crises	demands	an	agility,	speed	and	ambition	that	public	bureaucracies	are
generally	not	designed	to	deliver.	Decisions	will	have	to	be	taken	on	the	basis	of	imperfect	information,	in	an
emotional	context,	by	exhausted	individuals	who	are	well	aware	they	are	dealing	with	matters	of	life	and	death.
Politics	is	a	brutal	game.	It’s	not	for	the	faint-hearted	and	at	some	point	every	politician	and	official	knows	that	they
will	have	to	provide	an	account	of	each	and	every	decision	they	made.	And	yet	post-crisis	accountability	and
scrutiny	frameworks	are	rarely	concerned	with	lesson-learning	and	a	balanced	review	of	the	facts,	and	are	more
accurately	viewed	as	blame-allocation	processes	where	‘gotcha!’	is	the	favorite	phrase	and	scalp-hunting	the
favourite	game.
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The	contemporary	visibility	and	political	emphasis	on	‘the	experts’	is	therefore	a	double-edged	sword.	On	the	one
hand,	it	is	completely	rational	to	heed	the	advice	of	those	who	have	dedicated	their	professional	lives	to
understanding	and	protecting	public	health;	on	the	other	hand,	it	is	also	a	depoliticisation	strategy	in	the	sense	that
politicians	who	have	dedicated	their	professional	lives	to	not	going	MAD	(i.e.	falling	foul	of	‘multiple	accountabilities
disorder’)	will	understand	the	benefit	of	allowing	‘the	experts’	to	become	the	public	face	of	the	crisis.
Letting	others	take	the	stage	and	assume	the	position	of	lightning-rods	when	blame-laden	storm	clouds	are
amassing	on	the	horizon	is	a	political	strategy	that	dates	back	to	Machiavelli’s	advice	on	blame-avoidance
behaviours,	and	probably	much	further.	But	the	bigger	question	is	really	whether	‘the	experts’	quite	understand	the
politics	of	the	role	they	have	been	cast?
_________________
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